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Abstract
Given that the ethical paradigms and the personal characteristics of managers serve as
internally mediated controls for slack creation, our study examines if religion and religiosity
influence the propensity of managers to create budgetary slack. We focus on Islam
primarily because Islam does not recognize the divide between religious and worldly
affairs. Accordingly, we argue that Islam may influence a manager’s propensity to create
slack. Data was collected using a questionnaire survey. To control for variation effects,
questionnaires were sent to 91 managers of just one company, a Malaysian based Korean
company.  We found no significant difference between the slack created by Muslim and
non-Muslim managers. Thus, it appears that Muslims and non-Muslims are no different
where business matters are concerned.  Further, given that religiosity may have a bearing
on a manager’s propensity to create slack, we also examined the relationship between
religiosity and the propensity to create slack amongst Muslim managers.   The results,
although not significant, revealed that the more religious a manager is, the lesser the
propensity to create slack. Possible reasons for the findings are discussed.
Keywords: Islam, budget slack, religion, religiosity, Malaysia
Introduction
Budgetary slack creation is an act of misrepresenting actual performance
capabilities (Douglas and Wier, 2000). Some researchers have suggested that the
creation of budgetary slack is common in organizations (Merchant, 1985; Merchant
and Manzoni, 1989; Lukka, 1988) as it acts as a tool that is beneficial as a buffer
against uncertainty, particularly in dealing with multiple organizational goals (Davila
and Wouters, 2004; Stede, 2000; Lukka, 1988).  However, slack may have negative
implications for the organization.  For example, it results in the misallocation of a
firm’s resources, biased performance evaluation and low effort by managers
(Dunk and Nouri, 1998; Douglas and Wier, 2000). Given the detrimental effects
of slack creation, several researchers have attempted to identify the conditions
under which it arises and the means by which it can be controlled (Davila and
Wouters, 2004; Webb, 2002; Dunk and Perera, 1997; Fisher et al., 2000, 2002).
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Various researchers have suggested that the impact of culture on budgetary
behavior may be significant (Ueno and Sekaran, 1992; Tsui, 2001; Chow et al.,
1996; Abas, 1999; Goddard, 1997).  This is to be expected if accounting is regarded
as a socio-technical activity. In this case accounting is unlikely to be free of
cultural influences (see Violet, 1983; Perera, 1989). Prior research examining the
relationship between culture and budgetary behaviour has largely adopted
Hofstede’s (1980) national cultural dimensions. However, the broader concept of
culture includes habits of speech, material traits, art, knowledge, religion, society,
property and customs of government and war (Wissler, 1923). Faruqi (1989)
contends that religion is the very essence and core of culture.  Religious behaviour,
beliefs and experiences are part of the culture, and are regularly transmitted from
generation to generation in the same way as any other customs (Argyle and Beit-
Hallahmi, 1975). Thus, religion exerts a profound influence on many aspects of
human life and personality, and may influence the manner in which accounting is
practised. More specifically, religion may influence a manager’s budgetary
behaviour. Accordingly our study examines if, religion, and in particular Islam,
affects budget slack creation. Additionally, we also investigate the association
between a manager’s religious commitment and the propensity to create budget
slack.
Our study is pertinent for several reasons. Firstly, prior studies examining the
determinants of budget slack creation have not investigated religion as a variable
that may affect budgetary behaviour.  Our study’s focus on religion and its impact
on budget slack creation will contribute to the literature on culture’s influence on
management accounting practices. Secondly, previous studies on Islam and
accounting have largely focused on financial accounting and reporting (e.g. Hamid
et al., 1993; Baydoun and Willett, 2000; Sulaiman and Willett, 2003). Consequently,
a study investigating the influence of Islam on management accounting practice
is timely. Finally, religiosity or religious commitment has not been studied in previous
Islamic accounting research. Thus, the relationship between religiosity and budget
slack creation, and the measure of religiosity developed by the authors, will benefit
the literature in this area.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, as background to
the paper, discusses the Islamic worldview and the concept of accountability in
Islam. Section 3 focuses on the relationship between Islam and the propensity of
managers to create budgetary slack. The hypotheses of the study are developed
in this section. Section 4 describes the research method and Section 5 discusses
the results. Section 6 concludes.
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The Islamic Worldview
In order to understand how Islam may influence budgetary practices, it is necessary
to understand the Islamic worldview. The Islamic worldview is influenced by the
philosophic concepts of Tawhid (oneness of God), khilafah (vicegerency),
Rububiyah (God’s arrangement for directing things towards a perfect state of
human sustenance), Adalah (justice), Tazkiyah (purification), Syura (mutual
consultations) and accountability (Naqvi, 1981; Chapra, 1992; Ahmad, 1979; Arif,
1984). Such concepts provide a framework within which the Islamic social order
lies and this influences the manner management accounting is practiced (Sulaiman,
1998).
A Muslim’s outlook on life is governed by the concept of Tawhid (Unity).
Essentially, a Muslim recognises that there is only one God and man’s ultimate
accountability is to Him. Additionally, an individual’s relationship with other
individuals mirrors his relationship with God.  Both are equally important. Khilafah
prescribes the Islamic social order formed on the basic principles of justice, equality
and brotherhood. Rubbubiyyah refers to God’s arrangement for directing things
towards a perfect state of human sustenance. Muslims believe that there are
sufficient resources to sustain everybody to achieve God’s perfect plan for the
universe. This viewpoint is different from the basic tenet of neoclassical economic
theory that goods are in short supply (Gambling and Karim, 1991). It is within the
context of this divine arrangement that human efforts take place. As goods are
adequately provided by God for everyone, greed and self interest should not
exist.
The general theme of the Islamic social order is cooperation and mutual consultation
(shura).  An individual’s freedom of actions must be combined with a sense of
responsibility towards others and individual freedom is constrained by ethical
limits. Since social awareness and a concern for individuals are inextricably blended,
working for the welfare of others is the most promising way of extending one’s
usefulness in pleasing God. The emphasis on the well-being of the community is
implicit. One’s actions should be guided by what is best for the society, suggesting
an absence of self-interest and an emphasis on goal congruency. The philosophic
concepts just discussed have wide implications on how management accounting
should be practised. The concept of accountability and the practice of mutual
consultation (syura) are particularly relevant. These are discussed in greater
detail next.
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Accountability
Accountability in Islam flows from the concept of Tawhid. The Islamic sense of
accountability is different from that which is generally understood in the West.  In
Islam, accountability is viewed from two different perspectives: man’s
accountability to God, and his accountability to other men (i.e. society). Thus an
individual worships God and executes all his duties as a khalifah (vicegerent).
This constitutes his primary accountability.   Secondary accountability is established
through a contract between man and other men. One can regard the transcendent
accountability to God as “vertical” accountability and the accountability to other
men as “horizontal” accountability.  Examples of the latter include agency contracts
between the owners and managers, contracts between employers and employees
or contracts between superiors and subordinates (Sulaiman, 1998; Hameed, 2000).
These accountability perspectives contribute to the ethical development of the
ummah. Related to the Islamic concept of accountability is the issue of
responsibility. Responsibility in Islam is perceived from both individual and
community perspectives (Naqvi, 1981). An individual is required to expend his
best efforts in order to achieve a better material life. However, at the same time,
material well-being must lead to social justice and the spiritual enhancement of
society (Sulaiman and Willett, 2003).
Similarly, in the context of management accounting, the achievement of goals
should not be visualized solely from the company’s perspective. Rather, it should
meet the objective of satisfying the needs of the wider economic community. A
decision that is profitable to the organization but is harmful to broader society is
not permissible in Islam. For example, dumping toxic waste into the river violates
the responsibility concept. Similarly, with budget slack (given that it leads to wastage
and the inefficient use of resources) the community may be harmed (whether
directly or indirectly) by consequent increased costs and shortages. Thus, managers
who allow such actions and behaviour fail to carry out the trust (amanah) placed
upon them as vicegerents (khalifah) of God.
Syura (mutual consultation)
In Islam, mutual consultation (syura) is fundamental in achieving the ideal Islamic
society (Al Buraey, 1990). The Qur’an clearly indicates the importance of syura
in the following verse:
“…. and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then when thou hast taken a
decision, put thy trust in God.  For God loves those who put their trust (in
Him).”
(Al-Qur’an, 3: 159)
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The importance of syura is also portrayed by the teachings of Prophet Muhammad.
It is reported that the Prophet himself consulted his followers on matters pertaining
to the state, politics, wars and international relations (Sulaiman and Willett, 2003).
However, although Islam puts great emphasis on the principles of syura (mutual
consultation) there is no detailed prescription on its implementation. Its basic
concepts are therefore interpreted in the context of particular needs and
circumstances (Al Buraey, 1990).
In accounting the syura principle is illustrated in participative budgeting. It has
often been suggested that budgetary participation leads to slack creation.  However,
in Islam, participation in budget preparation should not necessarily be regarded as
an opportunity to create budgetary slack. Syura recognizes the opinions of every
member of the organization, regardless of their status, thus strengthening the
bonds of brotherhood. The objective of syura in accounting implies the sharing of
information between managers and subordinates, thus reducing information
asymmetry. The practice of syura may help to reduce divergence between
personal and organizational goals, since every member of the community looks at
social benefits as something that also serves individual interest. One would therefore
expect a Muslim manager’s propensity to create budget slack not to be high.
Islam and Budgetary Slack
Budgetary slack refers to the difference between the subordinates’ planned
performance targets and real performance capabilities (Chow et al., 1991, 1996;
Waller, 1988; Young, 1985, Young et al., 1992; Douglas and Wier, 2000).   Generally,
revenue forecasts are understated while expenses are overstated (Schiff and
Lewin, 1970; Dunk, 1993; Fisher et al., 2000). Thus, budgetary slack is a
phenomenon, where managers deliberately create the forecasts that are relatively
easy to achieve (Lukka, 1988). According to Stede (2000), managers create
slack to protect themselves against unforeseen contingencies and improve the
probability that budget targets will be met. This may increase the likelihood of
receiving a favorable evaluation and associated performance-dependent rewards.
Alternatively, managers may create slack to avoid intervention by upper
management and the chance of being fired or suffering reductions in bonuses
(Merchant and Manzoni, 1989). From this viewpoint, managers are (either directly
or indirectly) ‘forced’ to create slack in the budget targets since the organization
treats the budget as a primary tool to evaluate their performance (Stede, 2000).
The consequences of slack creation can be viewed from three different
perspectives: organizational behavior, economics and agency theory. From an
economic perspective, slack leads to inefficiency and wastage of resources (Abas,
1999). In this sense, slack-building behavior is regarded as synonymous with the
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behavior of a spendthrift institutionalized within the organization. Islam is strongly
against such behavior. Allah warns Muslims in the following verse of the Qur’an:
“….but squander not (your wealth) in the manner of a spendthrift. Verily
spendthrifts are brothers of the Evil Ones; and the Evil One is to his Lord
ungrateful”
(Al-Qur’an, 17: 26-27)
Secondly, from an organizational behaviorist perspective, slack creation is
perceived as a defensive, tactical response to deceptive behavior (Abas, 1999).
Slack may be regarded as synonymous with cheating. Cheating or deceptive
behavior is not accepted in Islam. God warns cheats of a great punishment in the
hereafter as in the following verse:
“Woe to those who deal in fraud. Those who, when they have to receive by
measure from men, exact full measure. But when they have to give by measure
or weight to men, give less than due. Do they not think that they will be called
to account? On a Mighty Day; A Day when (all) mankind will stand before the
Lord of the Worlds”
(Al-Qur’an, 83:1-6)
Thirdly, from the perspective of agency theory, slack creation is associated with
the self-interested behavior of managers. Such behavior may diverge from
organizational interests. The assumptions of a self-interested manager behaviour
underlying agency theory violate the concept of justice in Islam. The manager is
seen to be abusing the trust that God has placed in him as a vicegerent.
Transcendent accountability is particularly important in Islam.  In Islam, religious
and business matters are not regarded as existing in separate compartments.
Further, every material achievement is an outward expression designed to achieve
a spiritual objective that eventually gives meaning to existence (Sulayman, 1993).
Rodinson (1974) describes this attitude as follows,
(the) Koranic faith is also something more than intellectual conviction and
assent to the truths revealed by the Prophet. This conviction gives rise to an
attitude that commits the whole man. Faith brings peace to the soul, releases
one from fear, gives patience, endurance, resignation to the insults and ill-
treatment suffered in God’s cause, humility and the will to risk all for God and
carry out good works (p 83).
Self-interest in an Islamic framework denotes a freedom which is coupled with
responsibility. Islam regards self-interest on the same plane as collective interest.
Thus, an individual must be sensitive to the consequences of the exercise of his
own rights (Naqvi, 1994) so that when individual freedom is coupled with
responsibility, self-interest is kept in check.  Given this, one would expect Muslim
managers to have a lesser propensity to create budgetary slack than a non-Muslim
manager.
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Another deterrence to slack creation is contained in the Quran. The Quran warns
Muslims that the actions and inactions of every individual in this world will be
recorded and will be either rewarded or punished on the Day of Judgment. This
is stated in the following verse:
“ In whatever business thou mayest be, and whatever portion thou mayest be
reciting from the Qur’an, and whatever deed ye (mankind) may be doing, We are
witnesses thereof when ye are deeply engrossed therein. Nor is hidden from
thy Lord (so much as) the weight of an atom on the earth or in heaven. And not
the least and not the greatest of these things but are recorded in a clear record”.
(Al-Qur’an, 10: 61)
Further, Islam is for full disclosure (Baydoun and Willett, 1998) and against
information asymmetry (where information can be misused or exploited), as
evidenced in the following verse:
Seest thou not that God doth know (all) that is in the heavens and on earth?
There is not a secret consultation between three, but He makes the fourth
among them, nor between five but He makes the sixth, nor between fewer nor
more, but He is in their midst, wheresoever they be: in the end will He tell them
the truth of their conduct, on the Day of Judgment. For God has full knowledge
of all things.
(Al-Qur’an, 58: 7)
The creation of budgetary slack that arises from an individual’s self-interested
behavior is thus not permissible in Islam as it violates Islamic accountability and
responsibility concepts. This creates obligations for Muslim managers to set budget
targets accurately1.
On the basis of the above, it is contended that a manager’s religious affiliation
influences the extent slack to which is created.  The implied hypothesis, stated in
the null, is:
Ho1: There is no relationship between religion and the propensity to create
budgetary slack.
On Religiosity
The issue of whether an individual professing a particular faith religiously follows
the teachings of that faith is clearly of import to the preceding discussion. A
person may profess to be Muslim but may not be committed to Islam. Prior
research examining the relationship between religiosity and ethical behavior tends
to find little evidence of an effect. Smith, Wheeler and Diener (1975) for example,
find no differences between religious and non-religious persons regarding
dishonesty. Similarly, Hegarty and Sims (1978, 1979) found no relationship between
a person’s religious commitment and ethical business practices (Weaver and Agle,
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2002). Kennedy and Lawton (1998) found no support for the contention that
highly religious students engage in less unethical behavior than their less religious
counterparts. However, Agle and Van Buren (1999) reported a small positive
association between religious beliefs and attitudes toward statements of corporate
social responsibility (Weaver and Agle, 2002).
The negative results of the studies discussed above, according to Weaver and
Agle (2002), may be due to the relationship between religion and ethical behavior
being dependent upon the issues measured and measures of religiosity used.
They argue that there exist two potential factors that can help explain the results:
religious identity salience and religious motivational intention. Religious
identity salience refers to the extent religion determines one’s self-identity. The
larger the role religion plays in influencing one’s identity and behavior, the more
difficult for other factors to diminish the influence of religion on that person. On
the other hand, religious motivational orientation represents the motivation that
explains an individual’s reasons for practicing a particular religion. This could
either be intrinsic or extrinsic. An intrinsically oriented person treats religious
beliefs and practices as ends in themselves. For such a person, there is no hidden
objective to practice the teachings of a religion. The commitment to religion by
itself is beneficial and obligatory. An extrinsically oriented person, on the other
hand, practices the teachings of religion as a means to an end. For instance, an
individual who goes to church to satisfy social needs, to foster valuable connections
in a community or to achieve some other benefits is extrinsically motivated (Weaver
and Agle, 2002). Thus, the relationship between religiosity and ethical behavior is
moderated by the intrinsic or extrinsic motivational intention of the individual.
The foregoing concepts present some parallels to Geertz’s (1968) suggestion
regarding the distinction between the ‘scope’ and ‘force’ of religion. The former
refers to the range of social contexts within which religious considerations are
regarded, while the latter relates to the thoroughness with which such a pattern is
internalized in the personalities of the individuals who adopt it.   In the present
context, one would expect less dysfunctional behavior amongst managers who
are intrinsically motivated or where the ‘force’ of religion is strong.
Since an individual’s commitment to a religion (i.e. religiosity) may influence the
individual’s behavior in performing certain actions, the second hypothesis in this
study focuses on whether the religious commitment of Muslim managers influences
their propensity to create budgetary slack. This is represented in the following
proposition, again stated in the null form:
Ho2: There is no relationship between religiosity and the propensity to create
slack amongst Muslim managers.




Budgetary slack is measured using a five-item, Likert scaled instrument. The
questions are replicated from Stede’s (2000) and Dunk’s (1993) studies. The first
four items are measured using a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from ‘1’ (definitely
false) to ‘7’ (definitely true). The fifth item, asking respondents about the
attainability of their budget targets, has a 5 point scale ranging from ‘1’ (very
easy to attain) to ‘5’ (impossible to attain). The higher the scale, the higher is the
budgetary slack2. The five items are as follows:
i. I succeed in submitting budgets that are easily attainable;
ii. Budget targets induce high productivity in my department;
iii. Budget targets require costs to be managed carefully in my department;
iv. Budget targets have not caused me to be particularly concerned with improving
efficiency in my department;
v. The budget target for me is:
1. very easy to attain;
2. attainable with reasonable efforts;
3. attainable with considerable efforts;
4. impossible to attain.
Religious Affiliation and Religiosity
Religious affiliation indicates managers’ religion, chosen from a list provided.
Religiosity is generally more difficult to measure.   Islam regards every action as
an ibadah (religious duty) as long as it is done for the sake of glorifying God. The
first measure of religiosity asks Muslim managers if they regard working as a
form of ibadah (religious duty). We posit that the more the managers perceive
that working forms part of a religious duty, the less they will build slack into the
budgets.
The Qur’an and Sunnah3 guide the behaviour of Muslims. Hence, the second
aspect of religiosity asks respondents if they perceive their code of ethics as
being derived from these two sources (i.e. is their code of ethics guided by their
faith?). The more the managers perceive that religion guides their ethical code of
conduct, the less slack is expected to be built into budgets.
The last three statements focus on aspects of Islam that every Muslim regards as
forbidden activities (haram). Religiosity is thus measured by managers’
perceptions of five aspects of Islamic religious beliefs as follows:
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i. I perceive working as part of my commitment to God;
ii. My ethical code of conduct is guided by my religion;
iii. Gambling should be banned;
iv. Interest (riba) should be banned;
v. Alcohol consumption in moderation is acceptable.
Respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale of ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘7’
(strongly agree), the extent they agreed with each of the statements.   A response
of ‘7’ for the first 4 items and ‘1’ for the last item would indicate a respondent
most committed to Islam.
Sample
Since budgeting is a small part of a wider set of organizational controls, the focus
of the study is restricted to a single organization.  This controls for the variation
effects caused by differences in practices across organizations (Otley and
Pollanen, 2000). The specific setting is most likely to increase understanding of
the manner in which variables interact, and which can be later used to inform a
more general study (Otley and Pollanen, 2000). Access was granted by the largest
Malaysian based Korean company, which has factories in several states in
Malaysia. Questionnaires were mailed to its managers.
The case company has a total of four business divisions and ninety-one departmental
managers. Different organizational levels denote different types of decision-making
and the focus of this study is limited to second-level managers for two main
reasons. First, these managers are directly involved in the budget setting process.




Out of 91 departmental managers, 64 participated in the survey. This gives the
overall response rate of 70%. One respondent’s questionnaire was not used
because the respondent answered in a ‘straight-line pattern’, suggesting the
responses may be invalid. The majority of the managers are male (74.6%), aged
above 30 years (90.5%) and have a university degree or a professional qualification
(84.1%). Twenty-six managers are Muslims, 20 Buddhists, 3 Christians, 5 Hindus
and 9 ‘free thinkers’. In terms of ethnic composition, 26 are Malays, 35 Chinese
and 3 Indians. A summary of the demographics is presented in Table 1.
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Analysis
A factor analysis on the five items used to measure budget slack did not load on
a single factor. Consequently, items with a loading of less than 0.5 were eliminated.
Two items, ‘budget targets require costs to be managed carefully’ and ‘budget
targets have not caused the managers to be concerned about improving efficiency’
were discarded. A second factor analysis was performed on the remaining three
items but, again, the three items did not load on a single factor. This time, item 2
‘budget target induces high productivity’ was eliminated. This left a measure for
budgetary slack with two items (item 1 and item 5). A third factor analysis showed
that the two items loaded on a single factor. These two items are ‘the submission
of easily attainable budgets’ (item 1) and ‘the degree of the budget attainability’
(item 5).
1. Do Muslims and non-Muslims differ in their propensity to create budget
slack?
The overall mean for budget slack (Table 2) is 4.08, which may be interpreted as
indicating that slack is likely to exist in the sample studied.  There are no significant
differences between budget slack created by Muslims and non-Muslims. These
results are consistent with Sulaiman’s (1998) findings. Accordingly, we fail to
reject the first hypothesis. Thus, it appears that Muslims and non-Muslims are no
different where business matters are concerned.
Category Description N %
Gender Male 47 74.6
Female 16 25.4




Academic Qualification Degree 48 76.2
Professional Qualification 5 7.9
Diploma 10 15.9




Free thinker 9 14.3
Ethnic Group Malay 26 41.3
Chinese 31 49.2
Indian 6 9.5
Table 1: Business Governance and Management Accounting
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2. Are Muslims and non-Muslims different in their underlying values?
We next examined if Muslims and non-Muslims differ in their underlying values
pertaining to the five specific aspects of religiosity. There were significant
differences in all the measures (see Table 3). This appears to confirm that, while
Islamic beliefs figure prominently in the attitudes of Muslims, its influence does
not necessarily extend to the realm of business.
Actual range
Description N Med Mean Std Devn Minimum Maximum
Budgetary Panel 1: Overall 63 4.8 4.08 1.38 1.00 7.00
Slack
Panel 2: Religion
Muslims 26 4.55 4.63 1.25 2.4 7
Non-Muslims 37 4.80 4.62 1.13 2.4 7
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Budgetary Slack
To what extent do you agree
with the following Muslims t-test non- Muslims
statements? p-value
Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std Min Max
Dev Dev
1 Working forms part of 6.85 0.46 5 7 0.000 3.67 1.76 1 7
religious duty (ibadah)
2 Religion guides ethical 6.85 0.37 6 7 0.000 4.32 1.90 1 7
code of conduct
3 Gambling should be 6.27 1.95 1 7 0.000 4.89 2.25 1 7
banned
4 Moderate consumption 1.46 1.30 1 7 0.000 4.46 1.98 1 7
of alcohol is acceptable
5 Interest should be banned 5.96 2.18 1 7 0.000 3.33 2.03 1 7
Table 3: Perception Differences Between Muslims And Non-Muslims
3. Is there a relationship between religiosity and slack creation?
The second hypothesis focuses on Muslim managers only. The Spearman
correlation was computed between the slack creation and religiosity measures
for Muslim managers. The results are summarized in Table 4. The negative
correlation suggests that the more religious Muslim managers show less of a
propensity to create slack. However, since the statistic is not significant, we
cannot to reject the second hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
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Discussion
The negative results obtained in this study may be due to different perceptions of
what is a “budget slack”. Though many authors have argued that slack is
dysfunctional (Lal et al., 1996; Douglas and Wier, 2000), there are some who
advocate that slack is a necessity to the organization (Davila and Wouters, 2004;
Lukka, 1998), particularly in addressing uncertainty. This may explain why there
appears to be no difference in the perceptions of Muslims and non-Muslims
regarding the creation of budget slack. Other explanations are also plausible.
The first is the existence of intervening variables, such as the intention to create
slack and the consequences of slack creation. These variables were not measured
in this study. Another plausible reason is that the results of our study indicate that
the spirit of capitalism thrives, no matter what religious faith one subscribes to.
Materialist philosophy is, perhaps, so firmly embedded in the Muslim mind that
although Islam may have an effect on how an individual behaves, economic and
social pressures exercise a dominating influence over attitudes prevailing in
commercial life (Rodinson 1974). Rodinson observes that,
“among the merchants of Genoa or Venice in the middle ages, the shipowners
and bankers of Amsterdam during the Renaissance, the pioneer industrialist of
the Industrial Revolution in eighteenth century Britain, the financial magnates
of the imperialist era, and the American businessmen of today, we find the same
feverish chase after profit, the same quasi-ascetic dedication of their lives to
this pursuit” (p 217).
Geertz’s (1968) distinction between religiousness and religious-mindedness may
provide a further explanation for the results of our study. Religiousness is not
merely knowing the truth, but embodying and living it. Religious-mindedness, on
the other hand, offers reasons for one’s beliefs. Hence, if these two concepts are
related to the results that have emerged from this study it might be concluded that
the Muslim respondents illustrate a religious-minded disposition as opposed to a
religious disposition.
Finally, the results of this study are consistent with the ‘liberal’ theory of social
change and development.  According to this theory, all societies under the influence
of modern science and technology will eventually become urban in their
demographic distribution, industrial in their economies, democratic in their political
structures and secular in their thoughts, values and culture (Mehmet, 1990)4.
Table 4: Religiosity and Slack Creation for Muslim Managers
Spearman’s rho p-value
-0.059 0.260
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Conclusion
This study examines whether Islamic values appear to have any influence on the
propensity of managers to create budgetary slack. Data was gathered using a
questionnaire survey. Sixty- three (63) departmental managers of the largest
Malaysian-based Korean company were surveyed. The results suggest that
Islamic values do not influence the propensity of managers to create slack. Further,
the findings do not provide support for the contention that religiosity (or religious
commitment) restrains Muslim managers from building slack into the budgets.
The study has several limitations including the measures used, reliance on
respondents-perceptions, the non-random sample and its size, all of which make
the results non-generalizable.  Nevertheless, they raise several issues that need
to be examined in future research. For example, what is the influence of religiosity
on other behaviors such as organizational commitment or productivity? What is
the intention behind the incorporation of budgetary slack and what are the
consequences resulting from budgetary slack creation?  How do managers spend
the excess resources built into the budgets? Is slack incorporated in budgets for
personal or organizational purposes? Most important of all, perhaps, is whether
the business conduct of Muslims in a broader context, is as uninfluenced by
Islamic values as it appears to be in this study of the creation of budget slack.
Notes
1 There may be rare circumstances where slack creation is permissible. Managers may, for
instance, promote innovative projects by being overoptimistic in their forecasts. This action
may not necessarily constitute dysfunctional behavior but may buffer uncertainty, and thus
be acceptable (Davila and Wouters, 2004; Stede, 2000).
2 For statistical analysis, the five-point scale is transformed to a 7-point scale by multiplying
each value by 7/5.
3 The sunnah may be considered as the operationalisation of the principles in the Qur’an. It
refers to Prophet Muhammad’s customs, his words, deeds and habitual practices. The sunnah
is remembered and transmitted by a report known as the hadith.
4 Secularism refers to the eradication of religion as an institution in human society and erosion
of man’s faith in the divine and the transcendental (Haq, 1986).
References
Abas, Z. (1999). Budgetary slack in total quality management environment. Unpublished
Ph.d. Dissertation, Universiti Utara Malaysia.
Agle, B. R. and Van Buren, H. (1999). God and mammon: The modern relationship. Business
Ethics Quarterly, 9, 563-582.
Ahmad, K. (1979). Economic development in an Islamic framework. The Islamic
Foundation, Leicester.
RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY AND SLACK CREATION: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
63
Al Buraey, M. (1990). Management and administration in Islam. King Fahd University of
Petroleum and Minerals, Dharan.
Ali, M. Y. (2001). The holy Qur’an: Original Arabic text with English translation and
selected commentaries. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Saba Islamic Media Sdn. Bhd.
Argyle, M. and Beit-Hallahmi. B. (1975). The Social Psychology of Religion. London and
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Arif, M. (1984). Toward the Shariah paradigm of Islamic economic: The beginning of a
scientific revolution. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 2(1), 79-99.
Baydoun, N. and Willett, R. (2000). Islamic corporate reports. Abacus, 36, 71-90.
Baydoun, N. and Willett, R. (1998). Islam and Accounting: Ethical issues in the Presentation
of Financial Information. Accounting, Commerce & Finance:  The Islamic Perspective,
2(1), 1-25.
Chapra, U. (1992). Islam and the economic challenge. Leicester, UK: The Islamic
Foundation.
Chow C. W., Kato, Y. and Merchant, K.A. (1996). The use of organizational controls and
their effects on data manipulation and management myopia: A Japan vs. U.S. comparison.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21 (2/3), 175-192.
Chow, C., Cooper, J. and Haddad, K. (1991). The effects of pay schemes and ratchets on
budgetary slack and performance: A multiperiod experiment. Accounting, Organization
and Society, 16 (1), 47-60.
Davila, T. and Wouters, M. (2004). Managing budget emphasis through the explicit design
of conditional budgetary slack. Accounting, Organization and Society, article in press.
Douglas, P. C. and Wier, B. (2000). Integrating ethical dimensions into a model of budgetary
slack creation. Journal of Business Ethics, 28 (3), 267-277.
Dunk, A. S and Perera, H. (1997). The incidence of budgetary slack: a field study exploration.
Accounting, Auditing, Accounting Journal, 10 (5), 649- 664.
Dunk, A. S. and Nouri, H. (1998). Antecedents of budgetary slack: A literature review and
synthesis. Journal of Accounting Literature, 17, 72-96.
Dunk, A.S. (1993). The effect of budget emphasis and information asymmetry on the
relation between budgetary participation and slack. Accounting Review, 68 (2), 400-411.
Faruqi, I. (1989). Toward a critical world theology. Toward Islamization of knowledge
(Series No 6), International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, Virginia, USA.
Fisher J. G., Maines, L.A., Peffer, S.A. and Sprinkle, G.B. (2002). Using budgets for
performance evaluation: Effects of resource allocation and horizontal information
asymmetry on budget proposals, budget slack, and performance. The Accounting Review,
77 (4), 847-865.
ASIA-PACIFIC MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING JOURNAL, VOLUME 1 ISSUE 1, 2006
64
Fisher, J.G., Frederickson, J.R. and Peffer, S. A. (2000). Budgeting: An experimental
investigation of the effects of negotiation. Accounting Review, 75 (1), 93-114.
Fisher, J., Frederickson, J.R., and Peffer, S.A. (2002). The effect of information asymmetry
on negotiated budgets: an empirical investigation. Accounting, Organization and Society,
27, 27-43.
Gambling, T. and Karim, R.A.A. (1991). Business and Accounting Ethics in Islam. London:
Mansell.
Geertz, C. (1968). Islam observed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Goddard, A. (1997). Organizational culture and budget related behavior: A comparative
contingency study of three local government organizations. The International Journal
of Accounting, 32 (1), 79-97.
Hameed, S. M. I. (2000). The need for Islamic accounting: Perceptions of its objectives
and characteristics by Muslim accountants and accounting academics. Unpublished
Ph.d Dissertation, University of Dundee.
Hamid, S., Craig, R. and Clarke, F. (1993). “Religion: A Confounding Cultural Element in
the International Harmonisation of Accounting?” Abacus, 29(2), 31-48.
Hegarty, W. H. and Sims, H.P. Jr. (1978). Some determinants of unethical decision behavior:
An experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 451-457.
Hegarty, W. H. and Sims, H.P. Jr. (1979). Organizational philosophy, policies and objectives
related to unethical decision behavior: A laboratory experiment. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 64, 331-338.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related
Values. London: Sage Publications.
Kennedy, E.J. and Lawton, L. (1998). Religiousness and business ethics. Journal of Business
Ethics, 17 (2), 163-175.
Lal, M., Dunk, A. S. and Smith, G. D. (1996). The propensity of managers to create budgetary
slack: A cross-national re-examination using random sampling. The International Journal
of Accounting; 31 (4), 483-496.
Lukka, K. (1988). Budgetary biasing in organizations: Theoretical framework and empirical
evidence. Accounting, Organizations and  Society, 13 (3), 281-301.
Mehmet, O. (1990). Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery.
Forum, Malaysia.
Merchant, K.A. (1985). Budgeting and the propensity to create budgetary slack.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10, 201-210.
Merchant, K. A. and Manzoni, J. F. (1989). The achievability of budget targets in profit
centers: a field study. The Accounting Review, 64, 539-558.
RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY AND SLACK CREATION: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
65
Naqvi, S. N.H. (1981). Ethics and economics: An Islamic synthesis. UK: The Islamic
Foundation.
Naqvi, S.N.H. (1994). Islam, Economics and Society. London and New York: Kegan Paul
International.
Otley, D. and Pollanen, R.M. (2000). Budgetary criteria in performance evaluation: a critical
appraisal using new evidence. Accounting, Organization and Society, 25, 483-496.
Perera, H. (1989). “Towards a Framework to Analyse the Impact of Culture on Accounting.”
International Journal of Accounting, 24, 42-56.
Rodinson, M.(1974). Islam and Capitalism. Suffolk,UK: The Chaucer Press (Translated
by Brian Pearce).
Schiff, M. and Lewin, A.Y. (1970). The impact of people on budgets. The Accounting
Review, 45, 259-268.
Smith, R. E., Wheeler, G. and Diener, E. (1975). Faith without works: Jesus people, resistance
to temptation, and altruism. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 5, 320-330.
Stede, W. A. V. D. (2000). The relationship between two consequences of budgetary
controls: budgetary slack creation and managerial short-term orientation. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 25, 609-622.
Sulaiman, M. (1998). The usefulness of the current value balance sheet and the value
added statements to Muslims: some empirical evidence from Malaysia. Accounting
Commerce and Finance: The Islamic Perspective Journal 2 (2), 24-66.
Sulaiman, M. and Willet, R. (2003). Using the Hofstede-Gary framework to argue normatively
for an extension of Islamic corporate reports. Malaysian Accounting Review; 2(1), 81-
104.
Sulayman, A.H.A. (1993). Crisis in the Muslim Mind. Herndon, Virginia: International
Institute of Islamic Thought. (Translated by Yusuf Talal De Lorenzo).
Tsui, J.S.L. (2001). The impact of culture on the relationship between budgetary
participation, management accounting systems, and managerial performance: An analysis
of Chinese and Western managers. The International Accounting Journal, 36, 125-146.
Ueno, S. and Sekaran, U. (1992). The influence of culture on budget control practices in
the USA and Japan: An empirical study. Journal of International Business Studies, 4th
Quarter, 659-674.
Violet, W.J. (1983). “The Development of International Accounting Standards: An
Anthropological Perspective”. The International Journal of Accounting, Spring, 1-12.
Waller, W. (1988). Slack in participative budgeting: The joint effect of a truth-inducing pay
scheme and risk preference. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 13 (1), 87-98.
ASIA-PACIFIC MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING JOURNAL, VOLUME 1 ISSUE 1, 2006
66
Weaver, G.R. and Agle, B.R. (2002). Religiosity and ethical behavior in organizations: a
symbolic interactionist perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27 (1), 77-97.
Webb, R. A. (2002). The impact of reputation and variance investigations on the creations
of budget slack. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27, 361-378.
Wissler, C. (1923). Man and Culture. New York: Thomas Y.Crowell.
Young, S. M. (1985). Participative budgeting: The effects of risk aversion and asymmetric
information on budgetary slack. Journal of Accounting Research, 23 (Autumn), 829-842.
Young, S. M. (1992). A framework for successful adoption and performance of Japanese
manufacturing practices in the United States. Academy of Management Review, 17, 677-
700.
